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IS THIS REALLY
NECESSARY?

The Need for a New APA
The AP A is an important statute. It
specifies the ground rules for the operations of over 100 regulatory agencies.
Many of those agencies are the subject
of this publication. The extent to which
they affect our lives is little understood.
Political scientists and journalists are
enamored with the more visible posturing
of elected officials and the dramatic pronouncements of the judiciary. But it is
the everyday decisions of our regulatory
agencies which most affect our lives,
and it is this forum which is least understood. It is ignored not only by academia
and the press, but by other political
institutions as well. The degree of deference paid to these agencies by courts
and the legislature is well out of proportion to that quantum which may be
deserved.
We have previously commented on
the need to alter the portion of the APA
dealing with quasi-legislative rulemakingparticularly the need to restrict the Office
of Administrative Law from reversing
decisions of boards based on an alleged
lack of "necessity" for the rule, or based
on ex parte (private) contacts with special
interests complaining about rules after
they have received a fair hearing. (See
CRLR Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall 1988) at 8.)
The feature article written by Professor
Michael Asimow in this issue raises a
broad panoply of important questions.
We accept his invitation to begin discussion of APA reform-long overdue-by
commenting on the current structure of
adjudicatory discipline proceedings and
their review.
The adjudicatory part of the APA
defines the due process steps necessary
to discipline a licensee. Let's look at
how it works now. Normally, an investigation is undertaken by investigators of
a licensing board ( or of the Department
of Consumer Affairs). Where there is
cause for discipline and it cannot be
resolved through a warning, a formal
"accusation" is filed under the APA.
The Act then provides assiduously for
due process safeguards to protect the

6

accused. The right to continue to practice
as a physician, pharmacist, barber, embalmer, dentist, or landscape architect is
a "vested right" and its suspension or
revocation is a serious matter. The statute properly allows for notice of charges,
filing of an answer, right to discovery,
right to present evidence, the opportunity
to be represented by counsel, right to
confront the witnesses and evidence
against you, a decision by a finder of
fact, recording of the proceedings, and
right to appeal. The burden is on the
agency to prove violation of its standards
by "clear and convincing" evidencemore than the "preponderance of the
evidence" test in a civil proceeding for
damages.
This is all as it should be. But mechanically, the system runs as follows:
First, an evidentiary hearing is held
before a committee of the regulatory
agency or an administrative law judge
(ALJ) of the Office of Administrative
Hearings (OAH). Where a committee of
the regulatory agency presides over the
hearing, it often uses an ALJ to make
evidentiary rulings but otherwise decides
the case entirely itself. These committee
panels are generally dominated by persons in the trade or profession of the
accused. They are always volunteers. In
the case of medical discipline, they are
drawn from 250 physicians of various
specialties from fourteen different regional panels scattered throughout the state.
They sit on one or two such hearing
panels per year at most. They may or
may not practice in the particular specialty of the accused-most do not.
Where local volunteer practitioners
serve as hearing judges, they have no
training in administrative law and little
in law. They generally have never "judged"
outside this single context. They do not
know of the decisions of other similar
panels or of appellate cases. But they
make the critical decision: as the trier of
fact, they make findings as to what happened and recommend discipline.
Where an AU is assigned to perform
this task without such a panel, a number
of these deficiencies are remedied. But

here the trier of fact has no expertise at
all in the subject matter of what may be
a technical case and no access to expertise. In fact, the scope of practice of
ALJs may be wide and may encompass
cases ranging from removal of an alcohol
license to a Structural Pest .Control
Board case.
After this initial hearing occurs, the
matter is submitted as a "proposed decision" to the regulatory body as a whole.
This agency may then rewrite it. It may
or may not hear oral argument. These
agency governing boards, as with the
hearing panels, include-and are often
dominated by-those currently practicing
the trade or profession of the accused,
although not necessarily (or likely) in
the particular practice specialty at issue
in the case.
After this process is completed, the
case usually enters the courts for judicial
review of the administrative adjudication.
It is subject to writ of administrative
mandamus review by one of several thousand superior court judges. Since a
"vested right" is at issue, this court applies what is called the "independent
judgment" test for review. He/ she looks
at the raw evidence anew and makes an
independent evaluation. He/ she has no
expertise in the subject matter at issue.
Then the case goes to a court of
appeal for review, and then by petition
to the California Supreme Court. If there
is a federal constitutional issue, petition
to the U.S. Supreme Court is possible.
Where contested by the accused, this
process takes six to eight years to complete. Discipline is finalized commonly
over ten years from the time the initial
events leading to it occurred. Further,
the system has no reasonable means for
interim remedy to protect the public. In
cases where immediate action is warranted, the agency's only recourse is to obtain
a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and preliminary injunction from a superior court judge. Because the superior
courts see very few of these cases and
lack the expertise to feel comfortable
making a judgment about interim suspension or even about temporary license
restrictions to protect the public, very
few are granted. Only three have been
obtained over the past three years for
physicians-where the potential harm is
particularly egregious and the need for
interim safeguards most urgent. Not one
TRO has been obtained over the past
year in the face of 4,500 complaints
against physicians, 249 of whom had
their privileges revoked by hospitals
for medical incompetence endangering
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the public.
In addition to being ludicrously lengthy,
the system is expensive. The agencies
must pay for investigators (either their
own or on an hourly basis from the
Department of Consumer Affairs), transcripts, Attorney General time, and ALJ
time. One case can cost over $100,000.
The average case through initial hearing
costs over $20,000 out-of-pocket. Many
agencies, particularly those which are
small, literally cannot afford to discipline
more than half a dozen practitioners per
year, regardless of abuse. These agencies
are limited in their budgets to the "special
funding" of license renewal fees from
their licensees. For agencies with a small
number of licensees, this creates a very
real impediment to discipline.
The system also lacks the kind of
professional independence appropriate for
a serious police power decision to revoke
a license. Those judging represent the
"state" in the purest sense. That is, they
are deciding to invoke the power of the
state in the interests of the general public.
Such a decision is not properly made by
competitors or colleagues of the accused.
Contrary to the imputations of their
defenders, each of these trades and professions is not a medieval guild of tradespersons able to decide in cartel fashion
who is in and who is out. The decision
is made by a state agency. Expertise and
information may well be offered on an
advisory basis by those with a financial
and emotional stake in the profession,
but the decisionmaker on behalf of the
state should represent the state's interestperiod.
The system lacks the expertise for
informed decisionmaking which is, ironically, its justification. The call for "peer
review" rests on the false assumption
that "only a doctor can judge a doctor"
or "only a lawyer can judge a lawyer."
In fact, most discipline cases do not
involve any technical questions. Why
does one have to be a doctor to judge
the appropriate penalty for a physician
who is defrauding Medi-Cal or committing sodomy on a child or dealing drugs?
Most cases, in fact, fall into one of these
latter categories. But where there may
be a technical question involving expertise, how does it help to then have the
current system? Is the hearing panel or
the agency board of tradespersons going
to have expertise on point? How much
does someone in OB-GYN know about
neurosurgery? Does it really help to have
an ear, nose, and throat doctor on a
panel judging a technical radiology question? Or is a little knowledge likely to be
dangerous? How does it assure such ex-
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pertise to then have a generalist judge
with no knowledge at all of the subject
matter have the last word (i.e., writ of
mandate independent judgment review)?
Finally, the system lacks the one hallmark of any judicial system: consistency.
Predictability of outcome creates consistent expectations, enhances deterrence,
and stimulates efficiency-creating settlements. Attorneys are less likely to throw
the dice if the end result can be anticipated. The current system has very little
assurance of such consistency. The pool
of persons making the initial findings is
large and uncoordinated-not even knowing of each others' decisions. Judicial
review from one of many superior court
judges depends upon a stare decisis
system of review by courts of appeal in
six different districts, and is subject to
final disposition by a Supreme Court
with a workload which precludes realistic
accommodation of inconsistencies (except in extreme cases) between districts.
In short, the system is a mess. Nobody would have purposefully designed
it the way it is working. It simply evolved.
There is a better way. Here is how it
would work:
(I) An ALJ who specializes in a major
subject area and who has at least rudimentary training in the terms of art of
that subject matter would conduct the
initial evidentiary hearing.
(2) The ALJ would have available
to him/ her a panel of leading experts in
all subject areas and disciplines at issue.
The ALJ could call on any such expert
with relevant expertise to review evidence
and offer testimony "on the record" and
subject to cross-examination. Rather
than being a "hired gun" expert for
either side, this panel would be an ALJ
resource.
(3) The case would be appealed directly to a single designated panel of the
court of appeal and would be sustained
if supported by "substantial evidence"
(the substantial evidence test). A single
panel would hear all cases in a given
subject matter (such as medical discipline
cases), precluding conflicts between districts and assuring efficiently produced
consistency.
(4) A discretionary petition to the
Supreme Court would be available, as is
currently the case.
The entire process would be shortened from six to eight years to eighteen
months. The quality of the proceeding
would improve. Rather than asking four
different tribunals (plus Supreme Court
discretionary review) to make a low quality decision knowing that others will look
at it, you would have two steps. But
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those two steps have accountability, independence, and expertise. The current
system has two steps by amateurs who
know little about law, judging, or other
decisions, followed by two steps by
professionals who know little about the
subject matter and have no access to
expertise outside the hired experts and
adversarial posturing which does not
always serve finding the truth.
And you would have a body of judges,
the special administrative law judges,
available to impose interim remedies
after hearing to protect the public where
warranted. They would have knowledge
both of the law and the subject matter,
with available expertise, awareness of
each other's decisions, and independence
to represent the public interest fairly.
The current system is the result of
unintentional evolution of administrative
law and its review. The system we suggest is now reflected to a large extent in
the State Bar reforms of 1988 in SB
1498 (Presley), and is now under consideration for physicians in SB 1434 (Presley). It is a model deserving replication
for other trades and for other states.

Letters To The Editor:
MWD Responds to
Water Transfer Article
June I, 1989
Dear Editor:
We found Jon Ferguson's water transfer article, The First Major "Water
Transfer": Opening the Floodgates, in
your Winter 1989 issue quite informative.
His review of related water law focuses
needed attention on the institutional complexities required to achieve a major
water transfer.
We especially appreciate his use of
Metropolitan Water District's recently
executed agreement with Imperial Irrigation District as an important development in extending the use of southern
California's limited water supplies.
However, the article's title is overly
optimistic, and perhaps misleading. The
water transfer which the article describes
is in fact a water conservation agreement
between junior and senior rights holders, '
rather than an "open market" water
transfer. Indeed, one of the other junior
rights holders is currently litigating the
agreement's impact on its rights in
Coachella Valley Water District v.
Imperial Irrigation District, et al., No.
890165B (IEG) (S.D. Cal. 1989).
In the interest of developing a workable water transfer model, therefore, we
believe it should be emphasized that
Metropolitan's agreement with Imperial
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Ir
does not constitute a water transfer as
that term is commonly used.
One-Of-A-Kind Transaction. In particular, the agreement reflects a unique
institutional and physical arrangement
that may not be readily replicable in
other areas of California. More specifically, the agreement provides funding for
Imperial Valley water conservation programs that will enable Imperial to meet
its water supply responsibilities with less
Colorado River diversions than it would
otherwise use.
Under long-standing state and federal
contracts, Metropolitan would then be
able to increase its Colorado River diversions by the amount Imperial reduces
its diversions. Those contracts fully allocate all of California's Colorado River
entitlement to specific agencies in a clearly identified priority arrangement (Arizona v. California (1963) 373 U.S. 546).
Obviously this is an arrangement that
differs significantly from an open market
water transfer.
Federal Characteristics. It is also
important to emphasize that lmperial's
Colorado River rights are not conventional appropriative state water rights.
As Mr. Ferguson indicates, the development of the Colorado River has imposed
some important federal characteristics
on Colorado River rights. In return, the
federal projects assure Imperial a much
more reliable Colorado River supply
than it originally had.
The federal Colorado River Contract
Program also relieves Imperial from any
use-it-or-lose-it risks. On the other hand,
it allows Imperial to divert only the
amount of Colorado River water needed
for reasonable beneficial use within its
Imperial Valley service area. Any water
Imperial cannot use in that manner must
be left in the River for Metropolitan
and other junior California rights holders (State Water Resources Control Board
Decision 1600, at 10-18).
The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly ruled that the federal Colorado River
water contracts, rather than state law
such as that administered by SWRCB,
determines the allocation of California's
Colorado River water (373 U.S. at 58590). Nevertheless, SWRCB has authority
to determine whether Colorado River is
used wastefully once it is diverted into
California (Imperial Irrigation District
v. SWRCB(1986) 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160).
Consistent State Law. California law
also parallels the federal law in other
respects. In particular, it precludes any
transfer of lmperial's water rights to
areas outside Imperial Valley if that
would injure junior users such as Metro-
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politan (Water Code sections 170 I, 1702,
1706). Transferring Imperial water to
third parties for use in other areas would
obviously injure Metropolitan by reducing its rights to Colorado River flows
that are not needed for reasonable beneficial uses in the Imperial Valley.
California's water transfer and conservation statutes carefully preserve that
protection for junior rights holders such
as Metropolitan (Water Code sections
1005, 1012). Water Code section 101 l(b)
specifically conditions the sale or lease
of conserved water on compliance with
other "provisions of law," such as Water
Code section 1706, and article X, section
2 of the California Constitution.
Furthermore, those statutes apply
only to surplus water. Since California's
Colorado River entitlement is fully allocated, it does not include any surplus
water. The federal contracts, in fact,
authorize California rights holders to
use nearly a million acre-feet more than
California's basic entitlement (SWRCB
Decision 1600, at II-13). Metropolitan's
share of that entitlement is over 60%
short of the amount of use specified in
its Colorado River contract. Obviously,
Metropolitan will need any Colorado
River water that the Imperial Valley
does not need (id. at 53).
Prior Major Transfers. Conventional
water transfers, involving much larger
amounts of water, have been central to
California's urban population for generations, although sometimes marked by
environmental and other area-of-origin
controversies. For example, the City of
Los Angeles has been transferring water
from the eastern Sierra for over half a
century, while the San Francisco Bay
area has been transferring water from
the western Sierra for a similar period.
While these may not be considered
pure open market transactions under
today's conventions, they certainly are
major water transfers that have proven
very beneficial to California over the years.
We very much appreciate this opportunity to clarify these points and certainly commend Mr. Ferguson's continuing
search for workable and reasonable methods for increasing the efficiency of our
limited water supply resources.
Very truly yours,
Fred Vendig
General Counsel
Victor E. Gleason
Senior Deputy General Counsel
The Metropolitan Water District
of Southern California
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